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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT5 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
CHRISTOPHER KING, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
FACEBOOK, INC., and DOES 
Defendants. 
 
Case No.  19-cv-01987-WHO    
 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Re: Dkt. Nos. 20, 28 
 
Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)) 
provides broad immunity for interactive computer services providers against claims that treat the 
providers as publishers.  In this case, pro se plaintiff Christopher King alleges six causes of action 
against defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”), all of which are predicated on Facebook’s acts of 
removing King’s posts from its platform or suspending King’s Facebook account.1  King alleges 
Facebook removed multiple posts by him, and temporarily suspended his Facebook access on 
several occasions in 2018, for posts that Facebook deemed a violation of its terms of service 
(“ToS”).  The crux of his claim is that Facebook has violated its ToS in removing his posts and 
suspending his account, and that Facebook treats black activists and their posts differently than it 
does other groups, particularly white supremacists and certain “hate groups.”  Because each cause 
of action accuses Facebook of wrongful acts it took as a publisher, none survives the application 
of Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA, and Facebook’s motion to dismiss is granted.2   
                                                 
1 King’s six causes of action against Facebook are (1) breach of contract, (2) promissory estoppel, 
(3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (4) fraud, (5) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and (6) false and deceptive business practices under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code. § 17200.  
See Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [Dkt. No. 19] at 27. 
 
2 King asserts a seventh cause of action for “Defamation, Internet Stalking, Cyber-Bullying and 
Invasion of Privacy” exclusively against “unknown” Doe defendants.  This claim is based on his 
allegations that these Does posted defamatory statements on Facebook about him and his former 
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BACKGROUND 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Facebook runs a web-based social media service with over two billion users.  SAC ¶¶ 4, 
11.  King asserts that Facebook is the “World’s largest single alleged protector of Public Speech 
Rights the World has ever seen,” but has a mission to create a “Nation State” that intends to “crush 
all competition.”  Id. ¶¶ 11, 13–14.  King is a former civil rights attorney and journalist.  Id. ¶¶ 9–
10.  He joined Facebook in or around 2010, and often uses the site to post about his activism.  Id. 
¶¶ 10, 19, 37.  He also created the following site: https://howtosuefacebook.blogspot.com.  Id. ¶ 
38.   
King filed this action to “hold FB accountable to its TOS contractual arrangements.”  Id. at 
1.  Facebook has a contractual, adhesive set of Terms of Service (“ToS”) for its users, which King 
claims includes provisions that protect minority users from being punished for using certain terms 
in a “self-referential” or “empowering way.”  Id. ¶ 15.  He alleges that Facebook removed his 
access to the service or blocked content he posted on several occasions in 2018 for reasons it 
labeled as violations of the ToS.  In Spring 2018, he “was banned” by Facebook when he posted a 
complaint regarding a confrontation he had with an attorney where he commented that he “feels 
like he is being treated like a nigger and cannot fight back physically or he will be at fault.”  Id. ¶ 
30.  On November 2, 2018, Facebook “banned” him again for violating its ToS after plaintiff 
posted about an argument with a “white male” who “got in his face and dropped 5 F-Bombs.”  Id. 
¶ 31.  King posted the sheriff’s report of the incident on Facebook, describing the report as biased 
and pointing out the race of the witnesses juxtaposed with his own race.  Id.  He was “banned” 
four to five more times for posting about this incident, including when he uploaded photos of the 
confrontation and the following text: 
 
Nigger, Nigger, Nigger.... How dare you challenge me. I am a white male of some 
sort of privilege. I can basically spit in your face and drop 5 F-Bombs And the local 
                                                 
girlfriend “MH” and his current girlfriend “SW.”  Those posts were made through Facebook 
accounts held by users “Troy,” “Facebook User,” and “Lisa Marie.”  Id. ¶¶ 66–69.   King and 
Facebook agree that his defamation-claim is asserted only against these Does.  Id. ¶ 73.  There is 
no proof that King has served the Doe defendants as of the date of this Order. 
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Sheriff will find a way to ignore it. You stupid nigger. 
Id. at ¶¶ 32–33. 
King was banned again “on his birthday” for a violation of Facebook’s ToS, and banned 
again in Fall 2018 for another ToS violation.  Id. ¶¶ 34–35.  He was banned on another occasion 
for posts referencing Facebook’s banning of “politically progressive rapper Lil B the BASEGOD,” 
writing that “Facebook gunned down another nigger…” and “we’re dropping like flies around 
here.”  Id. ¶ 36.  Finally, his blog howtosuefacebook.blogspot.com was blocked from being linked 
to or shared through Facebook’s “Messenger” service due to an unspecified violation of 
Facebook’s “Community Standards.” 
 King alleges that Facebook’s treatment of black posters is not equivalent to its treatment of 
others, alleging that Facebook “has allowed whites to say the same thing that blacks have been 
banned for.”  Id. ¶¶ 47-49.  He relies on published comments and articles from Facebook users, 
attorneys, and a former Facebook strategic manager to support his allegation that Facebook treats 
its black employees and users differently than its white ones, and bans them for the exact sort of 
activism, content creation, and posting that he himself engages in.  Id. at 1–3, ¶¶ 17, 22, 25, 26–28, 
44, 47–48.  King alleges that Facebook’s own breach of its ToS is actionable because Facebook’s 
removal of his posts was in “bad faith” and “retaliatory” based solely on the content of his speech.  
Id. at 1, ¶¶ 24, 38–40. 
 Since the hearing on this motion, King has filed a post-hearing update, explaining more 
clearly an additional theory of liability; that Facebook has retaliated against him for his speech 
critical of Facebook.  He notes that Facebook has not blocked access to King’s First Amendment 
page but has blocked access to his How to Sue Facebook page.  As of August 20, 2019, Facebook 
has apparently reversed course and now allows linking to and sharing of King’s How to Sue 
Facebook page.  Dkt. Nos. 33, 40.   
II. IPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
King filed this case on April 12, 2019, days after an action alleging similar claims based on 
similar allegations was dismissed with prejudice in King County Superior Court (Seattle, 
Washington).  See Declaration of William Hicks (“Hicks Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 20-2], Exs. A & B.  In 
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that case, filed on November 7, 2018, King asserted three of the same causes of action against 
Facebook that he alleges here, Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Breach of Contract, and Promissory 
Estoppel.  Hicks Decl., Ex. A.  Those claims were based on materially similar allegations to ones 
asserted here, that Facebook improperly removed his posts, suspended his account, and 
discriminated against him and other black activists.  Ex. A at 14.    
In the Washington state court action, King voluntarily dismissed with prejudice his claim 
for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  Hicks Decl., Ex. B (11.13.2018 Stipulation and Rule 41 
Dismissal of Sole Federal Claim with Prejudice).  The Washington state court dismissed the 
remaining claims for improper venue and ordered King to pay Facebook’s fees and costs incurred 
to respond to a premature discovery motion filed before Facebook’s responses were even due.  See 
2/21/2019 Order at 2 (“[T]he court is unable to find that plaintiff’s motion was ‘substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.’”).  The Washington state 
court entered final judgment against King, denying a motion for reconsideration, on March 25, 
2019. 
King filed a First Amended Complaint in this case on April 22, 2019.  He filed a Second 
Amended Complaint – the pleading at issue on this motion to dismiss – on May 23, 2019, to 
clarify that his seventh (defamation-style) claim is asserted against the unknown Doe defendants 
who posted the alleged defamatory content about plaintiff and his girlfriends on Facebook.  
Facebook now moves to dismiss the six claims asserted against it. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 
if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its  
face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).  A claim is facially plausible when 
the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 
is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation 
omitted).  There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Id.  
While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts 
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sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.   
 In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 
Court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff.  Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).  However, the court is 
not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 
fact, or unreasonable inferences.”  In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 
lawyers.”  Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).  “[P]articularly in civil rights cases,” the 
court has an obligation “to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the [pro se plaintiff] the 
benefit of any doubt.”  Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).  
However, pro se pleadings must still allege facts sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine 
whether a claim has been stated.  Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 
Cir. 1982).   
DISCUSSION 
 Facebook argues, dispositively, that all of plaintiff’s claims are barred by Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA provides 
full immunity for interactive computer services providers against claims that treat the service 
provider as publishers of others’ information, which is what Facebook contends King is doing 
here.  Facebook also argues, in the alternative, that King’s claims must be dismissed for failure to 
plead sufficient facts. 
Each of King’s claims against Facebook seeks to hold it liable as a publisher for either 
removing his posts, blocking his content, or suspending his accounts.  These types of acts are 
barred by the immunity provided under Section 230 of the CDA.  As the Ninth Circuit has 
explained, Section 230 of the CDA “immunizes providers of interactive computer services against 
liability arising from content created by third parties.”  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC (“Roommates”), 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
Under Section 230(c)(1), “providers or user of an interactive computer service shall not be treated 
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as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
The goal of Section 230(c)(1) is to provide immunity to service providers from 
responsibility for posts made by their users and to allow for an editing and moderating process that 
does not hold providers liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they did not 
edit or delete.  Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d. at 1163.  Section 230(c)(1) immunity extends to 
service providers’ activities where they moderate third-party content, such as “reviewing, editing, 
and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publications third party content.”  Barnes v. 
Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).  The service provider receives full immunity, 
regardless of their moderation process.  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 
(9th Cir. 2003).   
Numerous courts have applied Section 230(c)(1) at the pleading stage to dismiss the exact 
types of claims asserted here by King.  See, e.g., Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:15–cv–
04145–EJD, 167 F. Supp.3d 1056, 1064-66 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (dismissing breach of contract claim 
and § 17200 unfair practices claim);  Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc, No. 15-cv-05299-HSG, 2016 WL 
3648608, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016) (dismissing claim for breach of covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing);  Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122–23 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 
(dismissing  claim for fraud);  Federal Agency of News LLC, et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18-CV-
07041-LHK, 2019 WL 3254208, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2019) (dismissing discrimination claims 
under Title II and 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261, at *7 (D.N.J. July 
31, 2014) (dismissing claim for promissory estoppel), aff’d, 612 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir. 2015).   
Most recently, the Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers in this District dismissed materially 
similar claims with prejudice as barred by the CDA.  Brittain v. Twitter, Inc., No. 19-CV-00114-
YGR, 2019 WL 2423375, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2019).  In that case, the plaintiff alleged that 
Twitter improperly suspended his accounts.   But as recognized and applied by Judge Gonzalez 
Rogers, the CDA protects from liability (1) a provider of an interactive computer service, (2) 
whom a plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another 
information content provider.  Brittain, 2019 WL 2423375 at *2.   
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Here, as in Brittain, there is no dispute on any of those elements.  First, King admits that 
Facebook is an interactive computer service provider.3  SAC ¶ 4.  Second, each of King’s claims 
seeks to treat Facebook as a publisher, because each is based on Facebook’s provision of the 
service for use by others or its moderator decisions on which posts to remove or not and which 
accounts to suspend or not.  Brittain, 2019 WL 2423375 at *3 (finding that claims that “ultimately 
arise from Twitter’s alleged decision to suspend” plaintiff’s Twitter accounts “seek to treat Twitter 
as a publisher under the CDA”); cf. Fields v. Twitter, Inc., No. 16-cv-00213-WHO, 200 F. Supp. 
3d 964, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (provision of accounts is a publishing decision and claims based on 
provision of, or failure to suspend, accounts are barred by 230(c)(1)).  Third, all of King’s 
allegations rest on treatment of speakers (who make posts or otherwise provide content) and 
differential treatment of specific posts made either by himself or by other Facebook users.  
Brittain, 2019 WL 2423375 at *4; see also Lancaster, 2016 WL 3648608, at *3 (holding that 
plaintiff’s own content satisfies the “published by another information content provider” prong of 
the CDA immunity test).   
At oral argument, I asked King to explain why – if I followed this line of cases – his claims 
could survive dismissal.  He essentially asked me to depart from these cases and follow instead 
Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc., 15-CV-03221-RMW, 2016 WL 6540452, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 
2016), which predated the cases identified above.  The only claim that survived dismissal there 
was one for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Darnaa is a very different 
case than this one.  There, the defendant took actions against the economic interest of plaintiff and 
in favor of defendants’ business partner.  Id. at *8-9.  That did not happen here, and the rationale 
of Darnaa does not save King’s currently alleged claims.  Each of King’s currently alleged claims 
                                                 
3 An “interactive computer service” is “any information service, system, or access software 
provider that that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.”  47 
U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).  Many courts have confirmed that Facebook it is an interactive computer 
service provider.  See Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1093 
(N.D. Cal 205) (holding that Facebook is a platform that “provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer service as required by § 230”); see also Obado, 2014 WL 3778261, 
at *7. 
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is barred as a matter of law under the CDA.4 
 King’s current claims against Facebook will be dismissed with prejudice.  However, King 
argued at the hearing that he has alleged or could allege more clearly a claim for “retaliatory 
breach.”  That claim would not be based on Facebook’s discrimination between speakers.  Instead, 
it would be based on Facebook’s specific targeting and blocking of King’s speech that is critical of 
Facebook.  This theory is the subject of at least two of King’s post-hearing submissions.  Dkt. 
Nos. 33, 40.  Because this claim is not clearly alleged in the SAC, and given that King is 
proceeding pro se, I give him limited leave to amend to expressly allege a claim for retaliatory 
breach of the ToS based on the treatment of his speech that is critical of Facebook.   
CONCLUSION 
Facebook’s motion to dismiss the claims asserted against it (Claims 1-6) is GRANTED 
and those currently alleged claims are DISMISED WITH PREJUDICE as barred under the CDA.  
King is given limited leave to amend within 20 days of this Order to more clearly allege his claim 
that Facebook engaged in retaliatory conduct by removing his posts or suspending his accounts 
based on his speech that was critical of Facebook.   
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: September 5, 2019 
 
  
William H. Orrick 
United States District Judge 
                                                 
4 I do not, therefore, reach Facebook’s alternate argument that each claim must be dismissed for 
failure to allege sufficient facts.  I also note, however, that plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim of 
discrimination is barred because this exact claim was dismissed with prejudice from the 
Washington State case, an issue King failed to address in his opposition.  See Cruz v. Select 
Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 19-CV-00283-LHK, 2019 WL 2299857, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 
2019) (dismissing prior-alleged claims due to res judicata). 
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